A Universal Definition of Good

8/7/2012

So far, in posts about tenets one, two, three, and four, I've made a lot of observations about what the universe is. It's knowable...but really large and changing. It's forces can bring matter together...but they can also tear it apart. Our senses can deceive us...but our reason can unveil the trickery. We are a product of this universe...but the universe doesn't care about us. These descriptions give us a good idea of where we are. Tenet 5 of Evolutionary Philosophy, however, takes us in a new direction - where we want to go.

5. A universal definition of good arises from nature. Good is that which enables the long-term survival of life.

Good has had many definitions throughout history. It was what felt good, it was what our elders told us, it was what our leaders demanded, it was divinely revealed to kings, it was what a god told a priest, it was what philosophers argued, it was whatever your society voted for, and it went back to what feels good. It's no wonder that relativists threw up their hands and said there is no definition of good so figure it out for yourselves.

But these were not true definitions of good. They were not true because they were not grounded in the reality of our universe. They relied on isolated individuals, mythical creatures, ignorant arguments, and general confusion. Sure, many of the rules that came out of these definitions of good may have been correct, but not all of them. The need to obey your king, the need to avoid mixing meat and dairy, the need to stone adulterers - these and many other rules for good behavior have gone extinct. And the thing that corrected these false rules was not a better god, a better ruler, or a better philosopher; it was the dawning feeling that these rules were leading us off a cliff. The cringe that we feel when we think about drowning witches, burning heretics, and mutilating genitals, is not a voice in our heads from a new religion. Quite simply, it is just the growth in understanding of what enables life to survive in the long term. That is the voice of our conscience. That is the source of our morals. That is the basis for our definition of good. It arises naturally from an understanding of both the history, shape, and rules of our universe as well as the course of evolution that has led us to the place we occupy here, and it will evolve in the future as our knowledge of history, science, systems, and consequences grows.

I'll get into many of the implications of this definition later. I'll also get into some distinctions of what exactly does or doesn't enable the long term survival of life. But for now, I just want to hear some thoughts about this bold claim. Do you agree with it? What could refute this? Can it be that the the answer to the eternal question, "What is the meaning of life?", is simply...to live!

13 Comments

Mark Sloan link

9/13/2012 03:52:11 pm

Our intuitive identification of “good” does arise from nature, but “good” is not necessarily “that which enables the long-term survival of life” because what people perceive as intuitively good is a function of both our evolved biology and our evolved culture.
The intuitive recognition of good is a function of our biology which was selected for by increased reproductive fitness in our ancestors. But part of that biological machinery is a wonderful bit that shapes our intuitions based on our experiences and in particular our experiences regarding cultural norms. Cultural norms can be selected based on whatever people find attractive, which will not necessarily include reproductive fitness as is evident by examining past and present enforced moral standards. Therefore, what we intuitively recognize as good is shaped by forces that may have nothing to do with reproductive fitness.

Our intuitive recognition of “good” is a biological and cultural evolutionary adaptation, but not necessarily “that which enables the long-term survival of life”.

Perhaps you are making your claim about the nature of “good” independent of its evolutionary origins in our biology and culture. If so, you will have to explain how you do that.

My area of interest is increasing the cultural utility of understanding morality as an biological and cultural evolutionary adaptation in the normal descriptive sense of science. I see that as much more culturally useful, as well as more relevant to philosophy, than seeking to define “good” based on reproductive fitness evolutionary arguments that are only about biology.

@EdGibney link

9/14/2012 03:43:07 am

Mark, I'm very glad to meet you. Thank you for commenting here and introducing yourself. I've just had a look through your website (www.moralitysrandomwalk.com) and see that we are very much on the same "side" and even similarly come from non-academic backgrounds in terms of philosophy. I'm following your blog now and hope we can have some fruitful dialogues in the future.

In regards to your comment, I think you may be misunderstanding the points I am making in this very short post, but I'm not entirely sure. I'll address your comments in the order they were written and lets see if we can understand each other better.

You wrote: "what people perceive as intuitively good is a function of both our evolved biology and our evolved culture"

I agree with that. We are shaped by gene-culture co-evolution as described in my Evolution 101 section.

You said: "Cultural norms can be selected based on whatever people find attractive, which will not necessarily include reproductive fitness as is evident by examining past and present enforced moral standards. Therefore, what we intuitively recognize as good is shaped by forces that may have nothing to do with reproductive fitness."

I agree that our cultural norms have changed over the millennia. I argue in other places that this change is caused by differences of opinion as to what is best for life in the short-term vs. the somewhat unknowable long-term. Our intuitions are conflicting because we must navigate a world that requires the balance of competition and cooperation (also mentioned in my Evolution 101), and we must be prepared for extremes of both cases (we are emotionally capable of fighting to the death or sacrificing years of personal happiness for the greater good). I'm not sure just how broadly you are defining "reproductive fitness", but I would say it should include biological predispositions towards culturally accepted behavior that creates an environment that is beneficial for life in the long-term. I do not think "reproductive fitness" is highest when it wins in the short term (say through aggression and rape - as is often pointed out by anti-natural moralists) at the expense of the long term.

You said: "Our intuitive recognition of “good” is a biological and cultural evolutionary adaptation, but not necessarily “that which enables the long-term survival of life”.

As I said above, our intuitive recognitions are conflicting because of the competition vs. cooperation, short-term vs. long-term, self vs. society debate that rages within us. This is what drives the "two faces" of man. We are neither inherently good nor evil - we are capable of both. And we develop cultural norms to enforce good behavior as we learn what that is over the long term. "That which enables the long-term survival of life" is the backstop that ultimately causes the changes in our moral norms. I see on your website that you are defining evolutionarily moral behaviors as "altruistic acts that also increase the benefits of cooperation in groups." But how do you define "benefits"? That is a subjective term that requires some golden standard by which to measure "benefits" or "harms". I say that standard is whether or not it enables the long-term survival of life. That is the ultimate benefit.

Have I answered your questions? Have I raised others? Let me know because I think we can help each other.

Mark Sloan

9/14/2012 03:31:10 pm

Ed, you have made several points that ‘echo’ elements of understanding morality as sets of biological and cultural evolutionary adaptations (biological and cultural heuristics) selected for by the benefits of the altruistic cooperation in groups.

For example, “this change is caused by differences of opinion as to what is best for life in the short-term vs. the somewhat unknowable long-term” and “we must navigate a world that requires the balance of competition and cooperation”.

Altruistic cooperation strategies are solutions to the cross-species universal cooperation-exploitation dilemma posed by 1) synergistic benefits of cooperation are available almost everywhere, 2) cooperation often, and altruistic cooperation always, leaves people open to exploitation, and 3) exploiting other agent’s cooperation can often be the winning strategy, but this destroys future benefits of cooperation. Altruistic cooperation strategies, that always include the option for punishment of exploiters, solve this universal problem and are the mother of all enforced cultural moral standards. So they can be seen as useful, but fallible, heuristics for sorting out “what is best for life in the short-term vs. the somewhat unknowable long-term”.

Second, “a world that requires the balance of competition and cooperation” echoes who is in the in-group and will benefit from the cooperation and who will be in out-groups that is not and who may even be exploited.

My interest is in the science of morality, morality understood descriptively as an evolutionary adaptation. Consistent with science being only descriptive (telling us how to do things, not what we prescriptively must do) science must, as matter of logic, be silent concerning what benefits of altruistic cooperation groups must seek and who, morally, can be in the in-group and who in the out-group.

Fortunately, people commonly come equipped with firm ideas on benefits and in-groups, so that lack of definition actually increases the cultural utility of the science; it does not decrease it.

My chief concern with your approach is that your assertion that what is moral is determined by “whether or not it enables the long-term survival of life” has no basis I can see in descriptive science.

If you want to make that a philosophical claim or simply as a definition, fine, there is no necessary logical error there, but then you have to justify that as prescriptive assertion about what morality is (by definition) or as what it ought to be. What philosophically justifies that as how morality ought to be defined?

If you want to understand the science of morality, it seems to me you must first understand altruistic cooperation strategies from game theory. Since you made several points that ‘echo’ elements of understanding morality as sets of biological and cultural evolutionary adaptations that motivate altruistic cooperation strategies, you would likely benefit by reading (if you have not read it previously) the book “A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution” by Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis. http://www.amazon.com/Cooperative-Species-Reciprocity-Evolution-ebook/dp/B0050PADW0/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

I hope you do have a read and get back to me on what you think.

@EdGibney link

9/15/2012 03:22:29 am

I haven't read that book Mark, but I've added it to the queue since I do want to study the math behind evolutionary selection more. I have a slightly different view of group selection that I think is more powerful than the one being modeled today and I would like to test that out and "prove" some of my ideas. (Essentially, groups don't only compete against each other for resources, but for members as well. They compete by expelling uncooperative members and luring cooperative members to their better society. Force alone can't conquer such a group - i.e. the US couldn't gain the advantages of the Scandinavian model by simply conquering those nations.) So thank you for that specific recommendation.

I am, however, somewhat well versed in altruistic cooperative strategy and game theory. I feature the Tit-For-Tat computer program quite prominently on my Evolution 101 page, for example. You are absolutely right that cooperation for the benefit of the group is the best way forward and fortunately we've even evolved to take pleasure in those actions and results. I'm just going further than you to define what those benefits actually are - the long-term survival of life.

I come at this definition from a review of the history of the universe. It sounds like you would agree with me that the universe is a blind and uncaring place with no sign of purpose or outside (supernatural) goal setting. In this universe, the only goal that arises is survival itself. To answer your call for a descriptive scientific version of this, it might be, "Life is alive, and it ought to act to remain alive." (Note that this is also my solution to the famous is/ought philosophical problem best described by Hume.)

What scares me very much about your approach is your statement that science "must, as matter of logic, be silent concerning what benefits of altruistic cooperation groups must seek and who, morally, can be in the in-group and who in the out-group." If that's the case, then you haven't defined morality at all. It's simply a recipe for how groups can best achieve their own goals, no matter how right or wrong those goals are. Just look at terrorists for an obvious counterexample to your position. They make altruistic acts that also increase the benefits of cooperation in groups. They sacrifice for one another in order to keep the group alive and acting towards their goals of jihad. But this is not right or moral. At least not according to my definition.

If we can see through science that the universe is described as I have above, and if we can know through science how interconnected and reliant all life is to all other life, then it is logical and vital to say that the benefit the group is seeking is survival, and the in-group itself is all of life. Your descriptive statement alone leaves too much room for very amoral conclusions from poorly defined, overly narrow groups with ignorant ideas about what is beneficial. That is why it is not good enough as the sole basis for morality. The broader view of the survival of life is necessary. And sufficient.

Mark Sloan link

9/15/2012 09:23:05 am

Regarding there being more strategies for increasing cooperation than have been carefully studied and described in the literature to date, I expect you would not get much argument that there are still a lot of strategies, such as you mention, left to study. My perception is that the academics doing evolutionary game theory don’t lack for imagination regarding adding strategies such as you mention, but they are still working their way up to mathematically modeling those levels of complexity. The field is still young.

How do you defend the claim "Life is alive, and it ought to act to remain alive” as part of descriptive science? I don’t see how it could be done. As Hume might have asked, how do you explain the “ought”?

For example, agricultural science can tell a farmer how to grow a lot of beans, but not that he ought to grow a lot of beans. Your claim of "Life is alive, and it ought to act to remain alive” is the logical equivalent of claiming that agricultural science tells us “Farmers ought to grow a lot of beans”. Science is not logically capable of making ought claims except of the instrumental kind. “If you desire X, then based on science Y, you ought (instrumental) to do Z”.

The science of morality is no different. It can only tell us, for example, “If you desire well-being for all people, then based on the science of morality, you ought (instrumental) to enforce cultural moral standards that advocate the most effective altruistic cooperation strategies to achieve that goal.”

At the Sicily conference I went to, I expect you would have been told, by everyone you talked to, that claiming "Life is alive, and it ought to act to remain alive” is part of descriptive science showed you didn’t understand the problem of making prescriptive claims based on descriptive science.

It would be an unacceptably poor sort of science of morality that did not explain why people have judged as not immoral acts of slavery, genocide, and all the other nasty stuff groups have been doing to each other. Science only tells us how to accomplish our goals, such as how to accomplish our goals using altruistic cooperation strategies (the means of morality) not what the ultimate goals of that morality ought to be.

To define a fully-fledged morality, and not just moral means, the science of morality requires groups define ultimate goals. My ultimate goals, and yours, would define as immoral “slavery, genocide, and all the other nasty stuff groups have been doing to each other”.

@EdGibney link

9/15/2012 11:40:31 am

I wrote too quickly to stuff my is / ought distillation into your call for a basis in descriptive science. I wasn't expecting anyone to object to the statement that life ought to act to remain alive. I felt that was fairly self evident (what's the alternative? it shouldn't?), but I'll try now to lay out my logical steps to this conclusion with nothing but descriptive statements and definitions - especially the definition of ought.

1. Life is alive.
2. Morals are rules that govern what is and is not acceptable behavior.
2a. Morals that govern behavior tell one what they ought to do.
3. Morals that tell life to act in ways that make it go extinct will also go extinct.
4. Morals that tell life to act in ways that lead to the long term survival of life will survive.
5. Morals that survive therefore must tell life to act in ways that lead to the long term survival of life.
5a. Morals that survive therefore must tell life that it ought to act in ways that lead to the long term survival of life.
6. Life ought to act in ways that lead to the long term survival of life.
7. Life ought to act to remain alive.

I hope that is clearer now, but please point out problems if you see them. I do want to be able to answer naysayers.

Mark Sloan

9/15/2012 03:47:06 pm

A more conventional premise conclusions form is

Premise 1: Morals that survive … must tell life that it ought to act in ways that lead to the long term survival of life. (a premise based on 1 to 5)

Missing premise 2: People ought to follow morals that survive.

Conclusion: People ought to follow morals that lead to the long term survival of life.

You have not justified the missing premise 2.

Hume might ask “Why should I do that if I feel motivated to do something else?” “Why not eat, drink, and be merry for tomorrow we may die (if that is my ultimate preference)?”

You are logically free to define a morality as “acting in ways that lead to the long term survival of life”. But people are logically free to decide they prefer to follow another morality, perhaps a brand new morality, which may be silent concerning the moral necessity of species survival.

The standard arguments against your category of argument are Hume’s – “No oughts from is” and Moore’s naturalistic fallacy - just because something exists (is natural) does not mean it is what ought to be.

Remember that the immoral horrors of eugenics were the result of the last time people tried (by bad science and worse moral philosophy) to link morality to long term survival of the species.

You have a very difficult case to make. Most people familiar with moral philosophy are much more likely to think it self-evidently false than that it is self-evidently true.

@EdGibney link

9/16/2012 12:55:41 am

But Mark, the reason previous naturalist moralities failed was, as you say, precisely because of the immature science and resulting errors in moral philosophy. Scientist philosophers at the time (Spencer chief among them) defined evolution as "survival of the fittest." They thought it implied a "law of the jungle." They thought that competition reigned supreme. But you, more than most, know the answer to that. It's altruistic cooperation. We have a much fuller picture of evolution today and it points towards a morality that is nothing like that of eugenics.

Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" is quite easily flipped on its head and retorted back as a "supernaturalistic fallacy." In a universe with no evidence of supernatural intervention, where else do morals (or anything for that matter) come from but from nature? Hume's "no oughts from is" is not a rule of the universe, it's just his logical conclusion. One that I believe I am proving is false.

As to your so-called missing premise - I believe you are confusing the definition of "ought" with the definition of "can". The definition of ought is that it is a verb used to express a duty or moral obligation. If we have morals that survive, we, by definition, ought to follow them. To answer your hypothetical Hume questions, we ought not to eat, drink, and be merry, because a) the surviving morals argue against that, and b) longitudinal studies from positive psychology tell us that is not the path to true happiness anyway (the very reason why that moral hasn't survived).

People are free to define new moralities and try them out. We have been doing that for millennia. And we will continue to do so in order to find, through trial and error, through a process of natural selection, those morals that survive. And what morals will survive? Those specific ones that generally lead to the long term survival of life. That is what we ultimately ought to do.

Mark Sloan

9/16/2012 12:46:52 pm

"If we have morals that survive, we, by definition, ought to follow them. "

I am unable to understand your explanations of why you think this is true. I expect you will face tremendous difficulties convincing anyone familiar with moral philosophy that this is a true statement.

@EdGibney link

9/16/2012 01:30:15 pm

Keep at it Mark. You'll get there. If you don't think life ought to try to survive, well then I'm sorry but those views will go extinct. Thank you for pushing me to be clearer about that.

Mark Sloan

9/16/2012 06:45:16 pm

Ed, have you tried out your ideas on any of the online philosophy forums? I have greatly benefited from discussions over the years on http://forums.philosophyforums.com/ethics/.

The quality of the comments varies immensely, but I have found it worth while.

John Stokdijk

11/21/2017 06:12:18 pm

But after the long term there is no life, there is nothing of value. In a few billion years our sun will die. Eventually all suns will die. Eventually the universe will be cold and dark.

Given this picture, it is difficult to accept that a universal good can come from nature.

I feel little joy about the survival of life but much despair. Yes, my ideas will go extinct but so will yours. Why should life act to stay alive if in the long term that is not possible?

Ed Gibney link

11/21/2017 06:35:50 pm

Thanks John. I would feel similarly if universal death were assured, but we don’t actually know the fate of the universe yet. The philosopher John Messerly has written quite a lot about this on his website and in a book about the meaning of life. He inspired me to send him an extended comment on this, which he turned into a blog post here:

https://reasonandmeaning.com/2016/04/16/meaning-in-life-as-being-part-of-cosmic-evolution/#comment-35905

Maybe this will help assuage some of the universal existential angst?

A Universal Definition of Good

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